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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Looking back to the last decades, corporate governance has become a 
fundamental element for an efficient corporate management.  
 
Numerous corporate and accounting scandals and the Financial Crisis of 2008 
led to a lack of investor confidence. This emerging doubt of the public moved 
corporate governance into center of attention. But increasing investor activism 
and globalization intensified the interest in corporate governance as well. 
Having an effective corporate governance system, whether in an individual 
company or in an economy as a whole, supports to restore confidence. 
Confidence, that is necessary for the appropriate functioning of a market 
economy.1 
 
Corporate governance is not only about enhancing investor confidence, it is 
also about promoting competitiveness and improving economic growth. Good 
corporate governance enables companies getting better access to financing, 
smaller cost of capital, better valuation and an overall improved performance.2  
 
But corporate governance itself was not enough. As a reaction to further high-
profile accounting scandals, such as Enron’s accounting fraud and WorldCom’s 
misstatement of their balance sheet, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been 
enacted. This legislation is a consequence of the lacking sense of responsibility 
of managers. The Act is intended to ensure the reliability of financial information 
reported to the public and to protect shareholders and the future investors from 
corporate accounting errors and frauds in order to restore confidence in US 
capital markets.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, called SOX or SARBOX, applies almost exclusively to 
public held companies. But even non-US foreign-listed companies who want to 
                                                
1 see OECD (2004), p. 11 
2 see Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012), p. 30 
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list in the US meet the same by SOX demanded legal and listing conditions as 
any other listed attendant of the exchange. 3  
In the last years, the incentive to offer stock on foreign stock exchanges 
increased tremendously. One reason for this tendency is the fact that 
shareholders discovered the necessity for risk diversification of their portfolios 
on an international basis. Another reason represents the company’s wish to 
broaden their shareholder base and acquire funds cost-effectively.4 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects the foreign listing behavior of a company: non-
US companies have to apply the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in case they decide to 
cross list at an American stock exchange. Non-US companies not being listed 
at an American Stock exchange are able to avoid this legislation.  
 
This work deals with the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the foreign 
listing behavior of non-US companies. Do they rather cross list at NASDAQ or 
NYSE and apply to SOX? Or do they decide to list at LSE’s Alternative 
Investment stock market trying to avoid SOX?  
 
Due to its shareholder rights and investor safeguard UK stock exchanges are 
the most comparables ones to US stock exchanges. Because of the absence of 
SOX, UK stock markets build the most similar counterpart to compare to US 
listing activities. Therefore I put focus on these exchanges analyzing different 
listing activities and comparing United States based and United Kingdom based 
stock exchanges in order to discover advantages and disadvantages for 
companies choosing a host market after the implementation of the Sarbanes 
Oxley-Act.  
 
                                                
3 see Investopedia webpage [20.02.2011] 
4 Karolyi (1999), p.10 
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2 Corporate Governance 
 
With the increasing importance of corporate governance, the size of the 
literature about that subject increased as well. In the last few years, hundreds of 
books and tons of articles have been written about corporate governance. 
Hence, a massive range of definitions exists. Reinhart Schmidt defines 
corporate governance in a very explicit way:  
 
“Essentially, corporate governance is about the distribution of decision 
and control rights; it is about governing and monitoring management, 
which typically has important residual decision rights; it is about 
influencing business policy; and it is about protecting stakes which are 
exposed to the risks arising from the incompleteness of contracts and 
markets and the asymmetric distribution of information and decision 
rights.”5 
 
Shleifer and Vishny keep their definition of corporate governance short and 
concise:  
 
“Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”6 
 
In a nutshell, corporate governance is some sort of approach by which 
companies are managed and directed. It involves a set of relationships between 
a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.7 
Good corporate governance should dispose the board of directors and the 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and 
its shareholders.8  
                                                
5 Schmidt (2004), p. 390 
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.737 
7 see OECD (2004), p.11 
8 see OECD (2004), p.11 
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Since investors can’t control the company themselves, they need to trust 
management’s performance. Thereby shareholders could possibly underlie 
opportunistic behavior, which is an outcome of the agency problem. This point 
will be covered in chapter 2.3. 
 
Corporate governance is about keeping the balance between economic and 
social intentions, as well as societal and individual intentions. This balance can 
be reached by transparency, which ensures that the interests of all 
shareholders, including minority and majority shareholders, are protected. The 
company should recognize the rights of their shareholders in order to enable 
them to fully exercise these interests.9 
 
Corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in different 
countries.  With the support of governments and international organizations, 
they have been issued from stock exchanges, institutional investors, 
corporations or associations of managers and directors. “The corporate 
governance framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment. In addition, factors such as business ethics and corporate 
awareness of the environmental and societal interests of the communities in 
which a company operates can also have an impact on its reputation and its 
long-term success.”10 “The United States, Germany, Japan and the United 
Kingdom have some of the best corporate governance systems in the world.”11 
This can be based on the fact that corporations in these market economies “are 
governed through different combinations of legal protection and concentrated 
ownership.”12 
 
2.1 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is a 
great example of an international organization being committed to market 
economy and democracy.  
                                                
9 see OECD (2004), p.12 
10 OECD (2004), p.12 
11 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.737 
12 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.739 
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Since 1961 the OECD represents one of the biggest and most trustable sources 
of comparable statistics and social and economic data worldwide. Besides 
monitoring trends, analyzing and forecasting economic developments and 
researching social changes, the OECD is one of the world’s largest publishers 
in the fields of economics and public policy.13  
In 1991 the OECD Ministers endorsed the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. Ever since they become an international benchmark for policy 
makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. Furthermore, 
these Principles of Corporate Governance regulate a foundation for corporate 
governance initiatives between OECD and non-OECD countries.14 
 
                                                
13 see OECD webpage  
14 see OECD (2004), p. 3-9 
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Table 1: The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (Source: OECD (2004), 
p.17ff) 
 
2.2 The Agency Problem 
One important perspective of corporate governance is the agency perspective, 
which is about the separation of ownership and control – or management and 
finance.15 Other perspectives of corporate governance are the shareholder 
theory and the stakeholder theory. According to the shareholder theory a 
company should act in the interests of its investors since they own a share of 
the company and therefore have voting rights. The stakeholder approach orders 
                                                
15 see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.738 
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the firm to act in the interests of its stakeholders that can be managers, 
customers, creditors, suppliers and the public in general. 
 
Back in 1776 Adam Smith has dealt with the Agency Problem already. In his 
book “The wealth of Nations” he describes this issue in the following way:  
 
“The directors of companies, being managers of other people’s money 
than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own.”16 
 
Jensen and Meckling have been the first authors applying the agency theory to 
the modern corporation defining an agency relationship as  “a contract under 
which one or more persons - the principal(s) - engage another person - the 
agent - to perform some service on their behalf that involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are 
utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always 
act in the best interests of the principal.”17 
Roughly speaking, the manager, representing the agent, has to raise funds from 
investors, representing the principal, in order to use them in a productive way or 
to cash out his holdings in the corporation. In return, they need the manager’s 
specialized human capital in order to obtain returns on their funds.18 Thereby a 
separation of ownership and control is formed.19 Conflicts of interest between 
investors and managers occur making this situation the initial point of the 
agency problem.  
 
The principal wants the value of his shares to increase in an immense way and 
to be extraordinary high, thus his interests are downright financial. The agent 
does not aim for an increasing share value – he is rather looking for private 
benefits. Those benefits are reflected in the economic chance to change the 
world, achieve power, gain recognition and stepping into some sort of 
                                                
16 Smith (1776), p. 330 
17 Jensen and Meckling (1976), p.5 
18 see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 740 
19 Berle and Means (1932), p.302 
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challenge.20 
 
The following questions are raised: How can the shareholder assure that he 
gets returns out of this project? How does he know whether the agent manages 
his funds in a rational economic way?   
 
Denis (2001) presents three possible solutions in order to increase the chance 
that the agent acts in concern of the principal: 
 
• Bonding solutions 
 A contract, bonding the agent to act in the principals’ interests, seems 
to be the most realizable solution. This contract contains how the 
returns of the investment should be allocated and what to do with the 
funds. In order to have a complete contract, every eventuality and 
possible future situation should be specified. I.e. the shareholders even 
would have to estimate what would be a value-maximizing decision in 
every state of affairs. Since we find ourselves in an uncertain world, 
arranging a complete contract including every eventuality is nearly 
impossible.21 
 
• Monitoring Solutions 
 Finding threats to management having the function to monitor these 
agents would be another possible solution in order to maximize 
shareholder value. The investors themselves seem to be the perfect 
monitors, but most of them lack the know-how and are not informed 
enough to make adequate decisions. Additional, the average 
shareholder owns a small fragment of the firm, i.e. monitoring the 
management would cause additional costs preponderating the benefits. 
 However, the board of directors, the management, creditors and large 
shareholders present existing potential sufficient control units.22 
 
 
                                                
20 see Denis (2001), p.193 
21 see Denis (2001), p. 196 
22 see Denis (2001), p. 196 
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• Incentive alignment solutions 
 Providing an incentive contract ex ante could cause the agent to act in 
the principals’ interest. Compensation incentives encourage the agent 
to make decisions that are able to maximize the agent’s return.  
 But such contracts can represent an expensive option if the contract 
provides irrational high incentives. 23  
 The manager can get incentives in terms of stock options, share 
ownership or even in a threat of discharge in case of poor 
performance.24 
 
These conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent, caused by the 
separation of ownership and control, can lead to agency costs. Agency Costs 
are composed of the total of the bonding expenditures by the agent, the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal and the residual loss.25 
 
2.3 Consequences of Weak Corporate Governance26 
As already mentioned above, economic incidents like the falsification of 
WorldCom’s balance sheet, audit fraud provided by Arthur Anderson and 
managerial corporate plundering by Tyco showed that bad corporate 
governance has a negative impact on investor’s confidence leading to a 
decrease in stock markets. But there are many other consequences resulting 
from poor corporate governance. 
 
Weak corporate governance can influence financial markets leading to an 
increased financial volatility and even financial distress. In contrast, good 
corporate governance can minimize the risk of financial crisis. 
Stocks from areas offering poor investor protection exchange at higher bid-as-
spreads and feature thinner expanse than stocks with better protection. 
Additional, stock markets in countries with good governance are better 
transmitters of information than stock markets of countries with weak 
                                                
23 see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 744 
24 see Jensen and Meckling (1976) p. 66 
25 see Jensen and Meckling (1976) p. 6 
26 see Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012), p. 16-18 
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governance. Stock return distributions also get affected leading to a decrease of 
share values indicating that firms with good corporate governance have higher 
rates of return. 
Net capital incomes of countries with poor governance react to negative events 
more sensitively affecting investor’s confidence. Since the expected return of 
investment is smaller and downfalls in currency in stock prices are observed, 
the risk of expropriation rises. 
 
Having a closer look at M&A activity highlights the importance of good corporate 
governance: the last two decades show an increased M&A action for countries 
with enhanced investor protection showing that these well governed countries 
build the market for M&A. Acquiring firms tend to offer better investor protection 
than their target firms which can improve the corporate governance system of 
the goal company after accessing. 
 
2.4 Attractiveness of the US Stock Market 
2.4.1 Legal Origin 
Differences in the quality of financial systems can be attributed to different legal 
systems that offer protection for their investors in order to avoid expropriation by 
insiders. These legal systems either have English, French, German or 
Scandinavian origin. French, German and Scandinavian legal systems emerge 
from the Roman law and form the representatives for civil law countries. English 
law is formed by judges and subsequently integrated into law generating the 
common law.  Depending on its occupation and colonization countries adopted 
one of these legal systems after achieving independence.27 
When it comes to expropriation by insiders, common law countries protect 
shareholders and creditors the most while French civil law countries offer the 
worst protection. The quality of Scandinavian and German civil law countries 
lies in between.28 
Investors receive weaker legal rights from civil laws than from common laws. 
                                                
27 see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 1131 
28 see La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1132 
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While French civil law countries offer the weakest protection, common law 
countries permit creditors and shareholders the strongest protection.29 
A good legal atmosphere protects investors and motivates them to drop funds in 
exchange for stocks enhancing size and range of capital markets. Civil law 
countries (especially French civil law) offer the worst investor protection leading 
to poor developed capital markets.30 This might explain the popularity of US 
stock exchanges since these markets offer the best investor protection due to 
their common law origin. Therefore the excellent legal protection a US stock 
exchange has to offer attracts investors. 
Additional countries with good protection within the law have more external 
investment in terms of wider and more valuable capital markets. So the legal 
environment does influence a company’s possibility to raise capital.31 The US 
stock market definitely benefits from this aspect since firms draw attention to 
markets offering good investor protection and enable external financing.  
 
2.4.2 Anti-self-dealing Index 
Every company has certain controlling bodies (managers, controlling 
shareholders etc.) that might abuse their power in order to expropriate investors 
by reaping money. This action, which is referred to self-dealing, implies theft of 
corporate assets, exaggerated compensation, executive perquisites, self-
serving financial activities (personal loans to insides or directed equity issuance) 
and detention of corporate opportunities. Legal protection supports avoiding 
expropriation by insiders and therefore induces market development by 
improving trust in markets.32  
Common law countries feature a higher index than civil law countries. Additional 
the anti-self-dealing index presents a way to measure the development of stock 
markets across countries.33 Because of this finding and the excellent investor 
protection, the US stock exchange presents an attractive market for investors.  
 
                                                
29 see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), p. 1115 
30 see La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1149 
31 see La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1132 
32 see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), p. 430-431 
33 see Djankov et al. (2008), p. 461 
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2.5 Shareholder Rights and Creditor Rights 
Capital markets feature a better overall development in case of offering 
improved shareholder and creditor rights. Due to an improved definition of 
creditor rights, more lenders tend to expand financing. Countries who made the 
decision to enhance their creditor rights even experienced an improvement of 
their financial growth. Additional literature shows that the development of a 
country’s financing market is associated with the magnitude of investor 
protection. In countries with superior property rights firms receive better access 
to capital. As a result, companies are able to make higher investments and 
expand faster due to this access to capital. Weak corporate governance would 
affect the development of small firms leading to less firms being founded 
caused by a lack of capital.34  
 
2.5.1 Shareholder Rights 
Shareholders have the right to vote for directors and decide on major corporate 
concerns. Shareholder rights include remedial rights, voting rights connected to 
shares and rights in the course of voting mechanism against meddling by 
insiders.35 
 
                                                
34 see Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012), p. 12 -13 in conjunction with Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
35 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1126 
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Table 2: Shareholder Rights around the World (Source: La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1130-
1131) 
 
Indicators of shareholder rights are pictured in Table 2. One-share-one-vote 
rules show a better investor protection since dividend rights are attached to 
voting rights. This way deprives insiders of significant control of the firm due to 
the lack of important ownership of its cash flows. Therefore expensive diversion 
of cash flows in relation to payment of dividends is balanced.36 
The six rights “proxy by mail allowed”, “shares not blocked before meeting”, 
“cumulative voting / proportional representation”, “oppressed minority”, 
“preemptive right to new issues” and “percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting” describe the strength of a legal system 
when it comes to encouraging minority shareholders against dominant 
shareholders or managers. The “antidirector measure” receives a score of “1” in 
case of protecting minority shareholders, otherwise it obtains a score of “0”. 
Mandatory dividends are a remedial measure since certain countries are 
obligated to pay out dividends. Firms offering rights for mandatory dividends 
might compensate this feature with another weakness concerning minority 
                                                
36 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1127  
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shareholder protection. 37 
Table 2 points out that the legal environment matters for shareholder rights. 
With the exception of “one-share-one-vote” and “cumulative voting / proportional 
representation”, the variables represent significant differences between the law 
of origins. Common law countries definitely show the strongest legal protection 
to shareholders while countries with French civil law offer the worst protection.38 
 
2.5.2 Creditor Rights 
Creditor rights represent a more complicated task since there exist different kind 
of creditors with different concerns: in case of default senior creditors wish to 
possess collateral security while junior creditors hope for the company as going 
concern in order to get at least some cash back. Therefore interests of these 
two members tend to collide. A defaulting firm has two ways to handle default, 
namely reorganization or liquidation.39 
 
 
Table 3: Creditor Rights around the World (Source: La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1136-
1137) 
 
Table 3 represents creditor rights around the world including five variables: “no 
automatic stay on assets”, “secured creditors first paid”, “restrictions for going 
into reorganization”, “management does not stay in reorganization”, “creditor 
                                                
37 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1128 
38 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1129 
39 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1134 
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rights” and “legal reserve required as a percentage of capital”.  
The origin of law matters and again common law countries propose creditors 
the best legal protection while French civil law countries offer the least 
protection. Comparing the shareholder rights of table 2 to the creditor rights of 
table 3 one can clearly see that the ranking of legal systems seem to be the 
same. However there exist two minor exceptions: First, poorer countries seem 
to offer stronger creditor rights than richer countries, which might result from 
their rules to simplify lending as a consequence of missing alternative finance 
opportunities. Second, German civil law countries do not seem to protect 
shareholders but take care of creditors. 40 
 
                                                
40 see La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1138 - 1139 
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3 Foreign Listing Behavior 
 
 
If a company decides to list its common shares on a different stock exchange 
than its domestic or primary stock market, it enters the world of foreign listing.  
Generally, foreign listing is frequently equalized with the term of cross listing, 
which assumes that a firm previously trades its shares on its home market 
before offering its stock on a foreign stock exchange.  
One of the fastest developing businesses of stock markets is foreign listing. 
There exists an ongoing competition between stock exchanges obtaining 
emitters in their home markets.41 An increasing number of firms listing on a 
certain stock exchange signals its capability being a financial center and 
therefore continuatively attracts foreign companies. 
The enthusiasm to trade instruments possessing equity nature on stock markets 
outside of a company’s home market emerged in the late 1900s already. 
However, since the 1960s the UK and the US have been the primary host 
markets making New York and London to the leading international financial 
hubs. New York and London based stock exchanges won over a tremendous 
amount of all foreign listing companies since they have been appreciated for 
offering corporate governance regimes being the most shareholder friendly.42 
Because of its enhanced shareholder rights and investor safeguard, the UK 
stock exchange is the most comparable one to the US stock exchange.43 
Due to its stringent legal requirements caused by the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the 
desire to list at an American stock exchange might be the most challenging one, 
but at the same time the most interesting choice.  
 
                                                
41 see Wójcik and Burger (2009), p.18 
42 see Wójcik and Burger (2009), p.4 
43 see Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008), p. 4 
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3.1 Reasons for Foreign Listings 
The number of challenging hurdles for many companies to list at an American 
stock exchange makes it even more interesting to examine the reasons for 
foreign listings. 
 
One of the most common reasons for foreign listings is incorporated in the 
bonding theory. If the foreign or destination market’s corporate governance 
system is better than the regime in the origin country and the destination’s 
market regime is more strictly regulated, this theory applies.  
 
“Large firms can choose the stock exchange(s) on which they are listed, 
and in so doing can opt into governance systems, disclosure standards, 
and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than those required or 
prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation. […] Yet, the most visible 
contemporary form of migration seems motivated by the opposite 
impulse: namely, to opt into higher regulatory or disclosure standards 
and thus to implement a form of bonding under which firms commit to 
governance standards more exacting than that of their home countries.”44 
 
The bonding theory indicates “that international firms can improve their 
corporate governance standards by cross listing in the United States in order 
to bond themselves to US accounting, disclosure, analyst report, securities 
coordination and legal practices.”45 Authors often talk about “piggybacking” 
since non-US companies are borrowing the American corporate governance 
system in order to commit to a better corporate governance regime.46 
Bonding can be classified into legal bonding and reputational bonding. Legal 
bonding defines the requirements determined by a stock exchange and its 
managers of capital markets a cross-listed company is subject to. In contrast, 
reputational bonding deals with the industry and finance community in terms of 
                                                
44 Coffee (1999), p. 23 
45 Ammer, Holland, Smith and Warnock (2008), p. 5 
46 see Licht (2003) p. 2 
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investment banks, investors, investment advisors, analysts, rating firms and 
audit companies.47 
 
This enhanced corporate governance standards cause an increased issuer’s 
visibility leading to the so-called “recognition hypothesis”.48 A company listing 
its shares abroad has to provide relevant information to the local capital market 
and consecutively the steady flow of information gives the capital market the 
opportunity to react in a faster way and to make more accurate decisions.49  
 
With this adjustment to a better corporate governance regime, a non-US 
company’s enthusiasm to comply with US disclosure requirements and 
securities regulation signals its capacity and provides an improved protection 
of shareholders’ interests.50 Furthermore, the strong legal protections 
determined by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) disclosure 
requirements, as a result of a listing on the US market, increase the protection 
of minority shareholders.51 Thus, investors have an overall improved trust in the 
company and institutional investors are attracted.  
The United States of America are known for offering their shareholders a 
stronger protection. Because of the greater investigation, observation from the 
press and from the investment association, firms listed in the US are subject to 
enhanced protection of their minority investors.52 Therefore controlling 
shareholders are not able to excerpt benefits on a private level of a company 
they are taking control of.53 
 
Moreover, cross-listing increases a company’s shareholder base and the 
company is able to diversify its portfolio internationally since a firm’s risk is now 
divided among more shareholders. As a consequence a company’s cost of 
capital decreases.54 This decrease caused by the risk diversification can be 
justified by overcoming investment barriers that have been caused by 
                                                
47 see Wójcik, Clark and Bauer (2005), p. 5 
48 see Foucalt (2007), p.2 
49 see Licht (2003). p.6 
50 see King and Mittoo (2007), p. 62 
51 see Coffee (2002), p.4 
52 see Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), p. 209 
53 see Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), p. 2 
54 see Foerster and Karolyi (1998) p. 31 
 19 
international discrepancies in disclosure requirements, accounting guidelines 
and regulation of taxes.55 
 
The decision to list at a US stock exchange can be part of a company’s global 
business strategy signaling to the market that it has become a global player. A 
company’s compliance with the quite high US disclosure standards shows its 
prestige and supports the company to earn the trust of either US or home 
country shareholders. The improved credibility leads to a higher confidence by 
the customers of the firm. Due to the high standards the company has to meet 
as a consequence of a US listing, brand recognition among US clients, potential 
future clients and also among international customers is build.56 Overall, a 
company improves its relationship with the host market and costs of trading and 
acquisition of a non-US company’s shares are declining.57 
 
The signaling or information hypothesis indicates that a US listing is some 
sort of statement of the company’s commitment to the US market and therefore 
a form of inexpensive announcement.58 A company can convince the market 
that it is in a strong financial condition.59  
 
Foreign listings feature other motivations in terms of liquidity. With the decision 
to list at an US stock exchange, a company trades its shares on the world’s 
largest stock markets. Simultaneously the liquidity of a firm increases due to 
higher valuations. A company observes this enhanced liquidity in higher trading 
volumes, increased share turnover, a lower price impact of trades and an 
increased share price due to a narrower bid-ask spread.60 The market reacts 
positively to a company’s movement to high disclosure since the stricter 
requirements the firm is subject to signals its capacity and financial strength to 
outside investors. Additional disclosure is an important part of investor 
protection. 
 
                                                
55 see Karolyi (1998), p.2 
56 see Schrage and Vaaler (2007) p. 17 
57 see Karolyi (1998), p.2 
58 see King and Mittoo (2007), p. 60 - 61 
59 see Bianconi, Chen and Yoshino (2010), p. 3 
60 see King and Mittoo (2007), p. 69 
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In general, a foreign firm’s share value increases after the announcement of a 
dual listing on an American stock exchange. Additionally, the firm value 
undergoes a rise due to the improved analysts coverage.61 
 
A company’s step into the American stock markets establishes a better 
entrance to larger capital markets. Additional it offers an increased capability to 
raise equity. With this lightened access to the American equity markets, the 
financing of investment is simplified and due to foreign listing a company’s cost 
of raising capital decreases. This leads to the “segmentation hypothesis” 
allowing companies to overcome investment barriers.62 
However, for many companies in emerging countries the main reason to list 
their shares on a foreign stock market is the possibility to raise capital through 
equity issues at the US capital market.63  
Due to its liquidity and depth, the US capital markets offer a way cheaper 
opportunity for foreign companies to raise funds.64 
 
The “avoiding hypothesis” suggests that “cross-listing reduces market 
segmentation and that legal and regulatory structures impose a costly 
burden.”65 Cross-listing offers investment possibilities to a wider range of 
investors. Additional the listing on a foreign exchange raises awareness that 
expands a company’s shareholder base and at the same time facilitates access 
to financing. The cost of capital decreases due to a better diversification of 
securities leading to distribution of risk. According to this hypothesis enhanced 
corporate governance is just the second most important reason to cross-listing 
since the primary factors are access to cheaper capital and improved emitter’s 
visibility.66 
 
                                                
61 see Coffee (2002), p. 31 
62 see Foucault et al. (2007), p. 2 
63 see Karolyi (1998), p. 2 in conjunction with King and Mittoo (2007), p. 61 
64 see Doidge et al. (2003), p.208 
65 Silvers and Elgers (2010), p. 4 
66 see SIlvers and Elgers (2010), p. 4 in conjunction with Licht (2003), p. 2 
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Another reason commending to cross-list is the option to improve a company’s 
ability to achieve structural transactions abroad such as tender offers, stock 
swaps and foreign mergers and acquisitions.67  
 
3.2 Who Cross-lists? 
Until the late 1900s companies from Europe, North America and Australia 
entered stock markets outside of their home country. But with the turn of the 
century emerging markets decided to trade their corporate shares on foreign 
markets as well.68 
 
An analysis provided by Wójcik and Burger (2009) indicates that most of the 
foreign listings are performed by large firms with their headquarters situated in 
significant economic centers arising from international orientated high-growth 
sectors. 
 
For non-US companies listing at an American stock exchange a very popular 
alternative is the ADR program. It is widely used among emerging markets that 
represent 73% of all non-US companies listing their securities in the US in 
1994.69  
 
Apart from weaker investors protection at the home market, companies with 
less developed capital markets and a lack of information quality are eager to list 
their shares at the US stock exchange.70 Emerging markets are ambitious to 
bond to stricter regulations and corporate governance rules than in their home 
market. 71  
Stock markets of emerging countries have insufficient disclosure methods and 
higher transaction costs. So if a company decides to trade its shares on a 
foreign market, it does have the opportunity to lower the investor’s transaction 
                                                
67 see Karolyi (1999) 
68 see Wójcik and Burger (2009), p.2 
69 see Miller (1999), p.104 
70 see Nguyen and Berkman (2008), p.5 
71 see Schrage and Vaaler (2007), p.3 
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costs. Better access to capital and a more revealing financial reporting is 
fulfilled as well.72 
 
According to Schrage and Vaaler (2007) the origin of Law and the Rule of Law 
matter. They mention that non-US firms from Civil Law countries providing 
weaker corporate governance regimes and offering stronger rule of law are 
more likely to cross-list in the US. Cross-listing levels are lower for non-US 
companies based at Common Law countries providing stronger investor 
protection with weaker rule of Law.73 
 
Additionally, the company’s origin does involve different incentives for its listing 
decision: While firms situated in emerging countries are driven to list the shares 
on a foreign stock exchange due to the possibility to raise equity capital, 
European countries are eager to gain an additional currency in order to operate 
stock-for-stock purchases.74  
 
3.3 Costs of Foreign Listings 
Besides the tremendous amount of advantages a foreign listing involves, a 
company also has to consider its hurdles – mainly in terms of costs.  
 
3.3.1 US Stock Exchange 
Non-US companies deciding to list their shares at a US stock exchange are 
required to reconcile to American accounting standards. Besides the fact that 
the reconciliation of a company’s financial statements to US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) involves high costs, this procedure is known 
for being the greatest challenge.  
Foreign firms choosing an US exchange as a host market have to register with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and should comply to US 
securities laws. Companies considering the US over-the-counter (OTC) market 
                                                
72 see Wójcik and Burger (2009), p.4-5 in conjunction with Edison and Warnock (2008), 
p.9 
73 see Schrage and Vaaler (2007) 
74 see Coffee (2002), p.21 
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to list their shares at or trade stock according to Rule 144a are not obligated to 
the SEC registration.75  
Direct legal and accounting costs as well as investment banking fees are part of 
the preparation for an upcoming listing.76 All reports including annual reports 
have to be translated into the foreign language in order to meet SEC disclosure 
requirements.  
Furthermore, the company has to face listing fees divided into an initial listing 
fee to be due once, and an annual fee that has to be paid on an annual basis. 
The annual listing fee presents some sort of assurance for the company for 
continuing to list its shares on the particular stock exchange. The amount of 
listing fees are conditioned by the number of shares a company is planning to 
issue. Every stock exchange demands its own listing fee making the NYSE to 
the most expensive way to list in the US.77 
With the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, a US listing 
implicates additional costs due to the stricter reporting and corporate 
governance standards. Especially the Section 404 introduces further charges 
for companies and executives.78 
 
3.3.2 UK Stock Exchange 
LSE’s Main Market enables companies to list ordinary shares and depository 
receipts (DRs).  
In order to list their corporate shares at this stock exchange, a firm has to be 
approved by the UK Listing Authority. Additional, financial statements have to 
be reconciled to either the UK or US GAAP, or have to be provided in 
compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IAS).79 
In contrast, a company eager to trade its shares at an UK stock exchange can 
choose the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which is well known for 
                                                
75 see Doidge et al (2007), p.8 
76 see King and Mittoo (2007), p.61 
77 see Perotti and Cordfunke (1997), p.4-5 
78 see Doidge et al (2007), p.1 
79 see Doidge et al (2007), p.9 
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insisting listing requirements at the minimum. A firm has to be encouraged by a 
nominated advisor and fulfill the exchange’s weak disclosure duty.80 
However, offering its shares at an UK stock exchange is a less expensive way 
for a company eager to enter foreign stock markets.  
 
3.4 Does Foreign Listing increase Firm Value? 
Listing on a US stock exchange provides companies the possibility to raise 
capital in a simpler way although a firm has to face increased costs as a result 
of better corporate governance regimes. Controlling shareholders are willing to 
face these costs in order to cross-list, even though this improved corporate 
governance diminishes their private benefits and they have to reduce their 
flexibility. As a consequence, firms with benefits exceeding the costs are willing 
to list their shares on a US stock exchange. Accordingly, corporations with 
foreign listings on the American stock markets are of greater value due to a 
cross-listing premium (which implies a higher Tobin’s Q than non cross-listed 
companies are offering). This hypothesis supports the assumption that a 
company has access to a greater amount of capital. 81 
Additional, this cross-listing premium is measured to be higher for companies 
with fragile legal protection for minority investors. This conclusion confirms the 
bonding hypothesis caused by cross-listing due to the stricter requirements in 
the US.82 
Summing up, companies cross-listing their shares should be worth more 
because of two reasons:  
• They benefit from possible growth chances that will not be accessible for 
corporations without a foreign listing.83 
• Due to the missing power of controlling shareholders cash flows 
achieved by companies are abducted as private profits to a lesser 
extent.84 
 
                                                
80 see Doidge et al (2007), p.10 
81 see Doidge et al. (2007), p.3 
82 see Foucault and Gehrig (2007), p. 2 
83 see Doidge et al. (2003), p. 215 
84 see Hail and Leuz (2008), p. 8 
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3.5 Types of Foreign Listings 
Besides the common way to list on a foreign stock exchange as an ordinary 
share, alternatively a company can get access to a capital market from abroad 
by joining a Depository Receipt (DR) program. In 1927 J. P. Morgan build 
depository receipt programs making them to attractive investment options and 
investment vehicles.85 
Basically there are two different types of certificates: 
 
• American Depository Receipt programs (ADRs) offering foreign 
companies access to the US capital markets. 
• Global Depository Receipt programs (GDRs) providing entrance to 
global markets beyond the listing firm’s domestic market.86 
 
Consequently companies get the possibility to register and earn dividends on 
US stock markets without direct access to the foreign stock market itself.  
DRs are negotiable certificates that indirectly represent ownership of shares in a 
non-US corporation for domestic investors. These instruments register 
depository shares that represent a specific number of underlying shares still 
being located on the deposit in the emission source’s home market.87 
Practically, a company decides to place its stock with a US depository bank. In 
return, the bank retains these shares and offers ADRs. These ADRs are quoted 
and traded in US Dollars, as well as dividends are rewarded in US Dollars.88 
ADRs being offered on an US stock exchange feature investors the same 
information as any other ordinary listed US share. Thus, non-US companies can 
offer their shares more easily to American shareholders.  
There exist four different levels of ADR programs giving companies the 
opportunity to invest in foreign markets in a cost efficient way: 
  
                                                
85 see JPMorgan Depository Receipt Guide (2010), p.3 
86 see JPMorgan Depository Receipt Guide (2010), p.3 
87 see Karolyi (1998), p.4 in conjunction with JPMorgan Depository Receipt Guide 
(2010), p.3 
88 see Higgings (2003), p.7 in conjunction with Citigroup Depostiory Receipts 
Information Guide, p.2  
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Table 4: ADR Programs89 
 
A Level II ADR enables a company to list their securities on a US exchange 
market but with this type a company can’t raise capital on a foreign market.  
Level III ADRs are certificates with the best reputation since they even provide 
an element of capital-raising for companies.  
Foreign companies listed on Level II or Level III ADRs are subject to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
3.6 The Influence of Cross-listing on Corporate Governance 
According to an analysis by Wójcik, Clark and Bauer (2005) companies offering 
its stock with Level II or Level III ADRs feature higher corporate governance 
ratings than corporations without a cross-listing on the US stock exchange. 
Even two years before the time of cross-listing and up to three years after the 
beginning of the cross-listing activity, companies experience benefits of 
corporate governance. These benefits include reduced capital costs, diminished 
investment risks and improved financial worth of asset shares. The previous 
corporate governance advantage can be caused by a company’s preparation 
for the US-listing including an adjustment of corporate governance. Then again, 
companies deciding to list in the US are likely to have high corporate 
governance ratings already. Offering stock on the US stock exchange 
                                                
89 see Citigroup Depository Receipt Guide (2005) in conjunction with Karolyi (1998), p.7 
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implicates advantages in the area of disclosure, take-over safeguard and board 
organization and operation method. On the other hand, Level II or III ADR 
companies do not exhibit increasing ranks of shareholder rights and 
obligations.90 
An analysis comparing companies with Level I or Rule 144 ADR listings and 
companies without a US listing showed no advantages for the year 2000, but 
presents corporate governance benefits like takeover protection and the board 
organization and operation.91 
Overall, offering its stock on the US stock market does have a positive impact 
on a company’s corporate governance ratings although the real reasons for the 
migration are unclear: do foreign companies move away to the US markets 
because they already have higher corporate governance ratings or do these 
migrating companies receive corporate governance ratings because of their 
move.92 
 
According to a survey contributed by Foucault and Gehrig (2007) cross-listing 
has two impacts improving the informational value of a cross-listed company’s 
stock price:  
• Cross-listing provokes stockbrokers to trade on their information more 
offensively. 
• Because of frequent listing on foreign stock exchanges more informed 
traders occur. 
Because of cross-listing managers receive more accurate stock price 
information and are able to decide on investment decisions in an improved 
economic way. In consequence, with the range of growth probabilities the value 
of foreign listings increases. Accordingly, companies with large growth 
probabilities take advantage of a company’s cross-listing.93 
 
                                                
90 see Wócjik et al. (2005), p. 13 and 19 in conjunction with Silvers et al. (2010), p. 26 
91 see Wójcik et al. (2005), p. 19 
92 see Wójcik et al. (2005), p. 20 
93 see Foucault and Gehrig (2007), p. 1-2 
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3.7 The Influence of Cross-Listing on Domestic Markets 
There exist two mechanisms describing the relation between liquidity of 
domestic firms and internationalization: migration and spillover. 
Migration describes the move from the trading of international firms leaving the 
domestic market and entering international financial hubs as a consequence of 
internationalization. This might be a result of lower transaction and information 
costs, smaller settlement risk and better risk pricing in international markets. 
Spillover describes the relation between aggregate trading in a certain market 
and liquidity of individual firms. There might exist spillovers through which 
aggregate market action impacts the liquidity of individual companies.  
Both, migration and spillovers, indicate that the issuance of depository receipts 
and cross-listing at international stock exchanges have a negative impact on the 
liquidity of domestic companies.94 
Besides migration and spillover, risk-shifting is another factor affecting the 
competitiveness of domestic markets: if companies decide to trade its shares in 
well-respected international financial centers, shareholders will relocate their 
risk trading into international companies out of domestic firms. This decline of 
tradings on domestic markets does influence the liquidity of domestic 
companies negatively. Since investors are well aware of the bonding effect a 
firm gets through commitment to stricter disclosure requirements, 
internationalization signals a company’s quality hurting the liquidity of 
companies remaining in the domestic market.95 After deciding to trade abroad 
the turnover of international companies increases by approximately 38%. 
Domestic trading decreases by 58% as a consequence of internationalization.96 
In terms of market capitalization, turnover in the market and number of listed 
firms ADRs had a negative impact on domestic market condition. The 
development of domestic stock exchanges seems to be harmed.97 
However, companies issuing Level I ADRs and raising capital under rule 144A 
(in the US) compose an exception: if firms decide to internationalize in one of 
these ways liquidity of local firms does not get reduced. These types of listings 
                                                
94 see Levine and Schmuckler (2005), p. 2 
95 see Levine and Schmuckler (2005), p. 2-3 
96 see Levine and Schmuckler (2005), p. 17 
97 see Karolyi (2002), p. 18, 27 
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tend to boost a company’s shares and therefore increase the liquidity of 
domestic markets.98  
 
                                                
98 see Levine and Schmuckler (2005), p. 14-15 
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4 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a corporate governance law with preventative 
character in order to avoid possible cases of damage and accordingly identify 
them at an early stage.99 SOX constitutes the background for regulatory 
initiatives in the field of transparency, corporate governance and internal 
control.100 
The Act is intended “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for 
other purposes.”101 
 
4.1 Reasons for the Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 
Investors and capital markets rely on the financial information provided by a 
company. Based on these statements reported to the public, private and 
institutional investors adapt their investment behavior.  
In the last decades, due to incidents like the Wall Street Crash of 1929, 
impending company crashes and numerous corporate and account scandals, 
like the ones provoked by Enron, WorldCom or Arthur Anderson LLP, investors 
started to develop doubts. Shareholders have been confronted with issues 
making their investment decisions due to oppositional and falsified information. 
Internal and external monitoring processes have not been sufficient any more.  
Because of the emerging lack of investor confidence and as a reaction of further 
occurring high-profile accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has 
been enacted on 30 July 2002.  
The Sarbanes Oxley Act is designed to ensure the reliability of financial 
information reported to the public and in general announced to every firm a 
company does business with. For example accountants, attorneys, banks and 
                                                
99 see Menzies (2004), p.12 
100 see Menzies (2004), p.7 
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other lenders, insurers, government contract issuers and of course 
shareholders and future investors should be protected from corporate 
accounting errors and frauds in order to restore confidence in US capital 
markets. All these institutions need to know whether a company’s management 
holds the purse strings, is aware of its reporting being accurate and honest and 
whether the management is willing to assume obligation for the company’s 
activities. Additional, a company’s management is requested to feature a 
competent internal control system.102 
 
Despite some difficulties in order to adopt the rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
to a company, this Act has been enacted to solve problems that occurred in the 
past. Besides regaining lost shareholder confidence, becoming compliant in 
terms of SOX helps a company becoming more efficient and encourages 
reducing negative influences like dishonest dealings, theft, redundancies and 
incompetence.103 It encourages companies to meet the requirements provided 
by investors.104 Additionally, adopting the rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers 
a competitive advantage to a company.105  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act manages the failure to comply with corporate 
governance codes and the insufficient self-regulation of external auditors. While 
audit companies have to follow tightened regulations concerning their 
independence, SOX defines additional implementations of corporate 
governance duties for the business corporation itself. Primarily these new 
implementations involve the management of internal controls.106 The system of 
internal controls requires specific process structures and supports the 
management in order to improve transparency and financial reporting.107 
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4.2 The History of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The idea of generating an internal control framework over financial reporting in 
order to promote transparency and assure effectiveness, and reporting material 
weaknesses to an external auditor is not completely new. In 1978 the 
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibility, called the Cohen Commission, has 
introduced the same concept already. Unfortunately, auditing professions 
decided to not attend to these concerns back then. Only after frauds like the 
ones caused by Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Anderson LLP have been 
revealed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been signed into law with the very same 
key thoughts that the Cohen Commission has been presenting almost 25 years 
ago.108 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been named after the Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
the House Representative Michael Oxley who both had principal authority for 
introducing a law that is nowadays known as SOX. Back in 2002, Senator Paul 
Sarbanes has been the chairperson of the Senate Banking, Urban Affairs and 
Housing committee. Michael Oxley was the spokesman of the House Financial 
Services Committee commissioned to monitor banks, insurance corporations 
and all actions going on at the Wall Street. At the end of 2006, Sarbanes and 
Oxley went into retirement.109 
On the 30th July of 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act into law, declaring that this Act is “the most far-reaching reforms of 
American practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”110 
 
4.3 Scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act holds for every company being subject to registration 
of the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and its auditor or audit 
company providing examination services. These include companies offering 
their shares on an American stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX) or 
somewhere public in the USA. They are called issuers. The Act does not 
address privately held companies. 
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The rules provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have not been constricted in 
terms of foreign private issuers. The term “foreign private issuer” indicates 
companies being addressed by SEC and having their headquarters abroad.  
Even subsidiary companies of SEC-registered companies not being located in 
the US are subject of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.111 Thus the Act appeals to 
foreign firms offering their shares in the US through Level II or Level III ADRs. 
Companies being cross-listed in the US with Level I or Level IV ADRs do not 
underlie SOX.112 
Delisting is the only option enabling a company to exempt the rules of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This procedure requires the corporation to withdraw from 
the US stock exchange, which is only possible if less than 300 investors with 
US residence are holding shares of the particular company.113  
 
4.4 Outline 
The framework of the Sarbanes Oxley Act consists of 11 titles presenting 65 
subtitles altogether. 114 
These 11 titles describe actions and their consequences to different target 
audiences like the management, auditor or the company itself.115 
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Table 5: Titles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Source: Menzies (2004), p.14) 
 
In general, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act pursues two objectives incorporated in 
these sections:  
• Section 302: Corporate responsibility for financial reports 
• Section 404: Management assessment of internal control 
 
The Act formulates specified standards for Section 302 and 404 and even 
mandates a CEO’s and CFO’s personal liability in case of failure to comply with 
these Sections.116 
 
Since Sections 302 “corporate responsibility for financial reports” and 404 
“management assessment of internal control” are known for causing the most 
difficulties and the greatest expenditure, the following subchapters will put a 
focus on them. 
 
4.4.1 Section 302 - Corporate responsibility for financial reports.  
Section 302 demands from CEOs and CFOs to own an efficient Internal Control 
System and to feature proper reports.117 The management has to make sure 
that all required publications are complete and correct.118 
                                                
116 see Menzies (2004), p.1 
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This chapter of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act obligates the CEO and CFO to make 
sure that all business related reports are published. This requires the 
establishment of effective disclosure controls and procedures. Additional a 
certification has to be provided by the CEO and CFO. 119 
 
4.4.2 Section 404 - Management assessment of internal control.  
Section 404 obligates every management to build an effective Internal Control 
System.120 Basically, a framework consisting of internal controls defines 
procedures a company has to make and how to operate these procedures.121 
Every annual financial statement being generated according to Sections 13(a) 
or 15(d) of the Securities-Exchange Act has to include a report about the 
internal control system of a company. Additional, it has to feature the 
management’s evaluation about the effectiveness of the internal control 
system.122  
The internal control system has to assure the financial reporting’s reliability. 
Additional it has to confirm that the preparation of annual statements has been 
provided in accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.123  
In contrast to Section 302, in the framework of the annual statements an auditor 
has to testify an internal control framework’s effectiveness due to section 404b. 
The PCAOB has to release an auditing standard as a basis for this 
attestation.124 
Being compliant according to Section 404 “Management Assessment of Internal 
Control” does exhibit the most demanding effort of implementation of all 
Sections provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The implementation of this 
section should avoid the incorporation of false and insufficient information into 
the financial reporting and the misguidance of investors due to the lack of 
internal controls.125 
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Besides demanding companies to testify their annual and quarterly statement, 
Sections 302 and 404 of the SOA prescribe that, along with the management’s 
evaluation of their internal controls about the financial reporting, external 
auditors have to judge separately the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control 
framework. Companies have to reveal material changes of their internal controls 
in their quarterly SEC filings. Material deficiencies of internal controls have to be 
exhibited in a company’s annual form 10k filings and reported to the SEC. 126 
 
4.5 Focus on Selected Sections 
The following sections contain interesting aspects supporting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to generate environment for the numerous company and regulatory 
initiatives in the areas corporate governance, internal control and 
transparency.127 
 
Section 101 to 109 of Title I - Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) 
 
This Title of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act builds the Public Accounting Oversight 
Board with the task of watching the auditing firms of public companies. The 
PCAOB cooperates with the SEC and works under the same rule like it. 
Besides pointing out rightly lawbreakers of the SOA and declaring 
punishments, the PCAOB offers regulations determining standards for audit, 
quality control and independence, and additional actions in case of disregard 
of guidelines.128  
 
Section 806 – Protection of employees of publicly traded companies who 
provide evidence of fraud. 
 
This Section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets the focus on the protection of 
whistleblowers establishing safety for employees who announce possible 
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fraud, falsification of business documents and other suspected accounting 
activities. The announced fraud might concern internal control matters, auditor 
activities and even abuse of governmental regimentation. The entrepreneur has 
to enable its employees to report these irregularities anonymously and he has 
to ensure that whistleblowers do not suffer disadvantages because of passing 
their considerations. 129 
“No company [...] or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by 
the employee.“130 
 
4.6 COSO 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act asks companies to generate an Internal 
Control Framework. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recommends adopting the 
framework provided by the Committee of the Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) in order to manage internal controls. However, 
SEC does not prescribe the COSO framework as mandatory. 131 The PCAOB 
points out that other control frameworks than the one provided by COSO can be 
employed, as long as they feature the same by COSO addressed topics.132 
According to SEC and COSO, internal controls have to ensure compliance and 
reliability of financial reporting. Additional they cover safeguarding of assets.133 
 
Since its formation in 1991, COSO has been incorporated more and more into 
US audit standards. Meanwhile, more than 63 % of US listed companies have 
adopted COSO as their leading framework in order to manage internal 
controls.134 
In 2004, an addition to the COSO 1991 framework, called the COSO Enterprise 
                                                
129 see Jackson (2006), p. 30-31 
130The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
131 see Menzies (2004), p.75 in conjunction with Panko (2006), p.12 
132 see Menzies (2004), p. 84 
133 see Menzies (2004), p.75-76 
134 see Menzies (2004), p. 81 
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Risk Management (COSO ERM), has been published. Compared to the initial 
framework, the COSO ERM cube (pictured below in Figure 1) features 
additional elements like international environment (which has been labeled 
“control environment” in the 1991 version), objective setting, event 
identification and risk response.  
The extended cube supports companies to provide compliance with regulations 
and laws, and to feature reporting in an effective way. This framework helps a 
company’s management to achieve their objectives and to prevent unexpected 
risks and downfalls.135 
The following cube illustrates the relationship between a company’s objectives 
and its enterprise risk management elements. These enterprise risk elements 
demonstrate what is needed to obtain by a company certain aspired 
objectives.136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the horizontal columns the COSO ERM displays eight components assigning 
that a company’s enterprise risk management is effective in case of featuring 
and running these factors effectively. Functioning calls for a detailed description 
of upcoming risks in the framework’s risk areas and the lack of material 
weakness. Furthermore, effectiveness has to be assured in every of the four 
objectives sections illustrated in the vertical rows.137 
                                                
135 see COSO (2004), p.1 
136 see COSO (2004), p. 4 
137 see COSO (2004), p.5 
Figure 2: The COSO Cube (Source: COSO webpage) 
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In order to accomplish an effective enterprise risk management a company has 
to feature a strong framework of internal controls. 
 
Since the COSO model has been invented back in 1991, long before the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, authors did not predict that 
someday their conceptual model would support the internal control framework 
of a company.  For that reason, it is absent of instruction and practical 
procedures demonstrating the management how to transform the law into a 
company’s control framework. Additional, a company’s management as well as 
their external auditor misses a guidance illustrating how to recognize whether a 
firm has an effective internal control system in order to monitor its financial 
reporting.138 
 
                                                
138 see Gupta and Leech (2005), p.32 
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5 The Impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on the Listing 
Behavior of Companies 
 
Due to the more stringent regulations provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
companies being eager to cross-list their shares on the US stock exchange 
have to face stricter requirements. US exchanges remark their concern whether 
these recent developments in law impact their competitiveness. The following 
chapter gives a brief overview about the possible financial consequences a 
company has to deal with in case of offering its stock on the US stock exchange 
after the enactment of SOX. 
 
5.1 Direct and Indirect Costs 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act implicates costs that can be grouped into direct and 
indirect costs.  
Direct costs are provided by the additional fees due the section 404 and the 
involved expenses for the implementation of internal controls. In order to assure 
the company’s compliance with the internal controls, further audit fees are due. 
In addition to these audit fees and costs of compliance, personnel expanses 
occur which are divided into the following way: due to the minimized accounting 
deadlines (e.g. the timeframe for the filing of 10-K has been reduced from 90 to 
60 days) and the raised disclosures, additional staff in the accounting 
department is needed provoking increased personnel expenditures. New senior 
positions like chief compliance manager are demanded in order to meet the 
reconditioned demands. Furthermore, the audit committee requires financial 
specialists and additional outside directors rising risk and power of executives 
and enlarging insurance expenditures and compensation of corporate 
officers.139 
 
                                                
139 see Ahmed, McAnally, Rasmussen and Weaver (2009), p. 6 – 7 in conjunction with 
Carney (2006), p. 5 
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Opportunity costs combined with enhanced risk aversion of managers and 
distracted managers form indirect costs.  
Opportunity costs occur because the company’s management spends a 
massive amount of time with constructing, implementing and assuring the 
compliance of the internal control framework. These actions deviate the staff 
from the day-to-day business activities and even new profitable projects could 
be declined. Small firms could face more issues concerning these costs due to 
their smaller amount of executives and as well growth firms due to their 
downsizing of intangible assets executives. 
The management’s enhanced risk aversion is based on section 302 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its liability of CEO and CFO to assure the annual 
statement. Accordingly, they face private lawsuits, prison and labor market 
fines. As a reaction of these tightened penalties, risk-taking of managers 
declined resulting in decreased capital expenditures short-term. But long-term, 
companies would miss the chance to present new products and lose their 
competitive power. 140 
 
5.2 Audit Costs 
Being compliant according to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a costly process. The 
formation and management of the internal control framework and continuative 
the raised auditing expenses are the most expensive implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The other components required by SOX are not as 
expensive to achieve.141 
 
The COSO framework does not offer guidance how to implement an effective 
internal control framework and how to measure a company’s effectiveness. This 
issue affects both – the corporation’s management and the external auditor -
since both institutions have to battle with the realization of control assessments. 
Additional, the question occurs: how much testing and documentation of internal 
controls is necessary in order to evaluate them and name a system an 
“effective” one? Due to this lack of generally accepted control assessment 
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standards, external auditors try their best do avoid risks and tend to over-audit. 
Thereby they pass these additional arising auditing costs to their clients. Thus 
the company’s auditing costs increase tremendously. 142 
The existence of a detailed guidance describing mechanisms how to analyze, 
report and evaluate risk, and continuative control failures, would help to 
diminish costs of compliance. The management could constitute an improved 
responsibility in order to generate trustable financial publications and control 
assessments. Furthermore, debates between the company’s management and 
its external auditor would be prevented. 143 
Since Section 302 and 404 do not feature directions to registrants how to 
evaluate their control effectiveness, the management follows the external 
auditor’s rules, as ultimately the audit company has to decide when a company 
completed their audit requirements in an efficient and effective way.144 
 
Eldridge and Kealey (2005) arrive at the conclusion that audit fees of SOX tend 
to increase with firm size while the audit SOX audit unit fees decrease.145 They 
observed audit costs reported by a sample of Fortune 1000 companies. For the 
97 companies representing a subsample due to their full disclosure of SOX 
audit fees, the average audit fees increased from $3.5 million to $5.8 million 
after implementing the rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146 
However, audit fees have increased by almost 20 to 40% depending on which 
industry is responsible for the estimation.147 The Wall Street Journal even 
reports that audit costs of American publicly traded corporations increased to 
30% or higher after the implementation of more stringent accounting rules 
according to SOX.148 
 
                                                
142 see Gupta and Leech (2005), p.32 - 34 
143 see Gupa and Leech (2005), p. 44 - 45 
144 see Gupta and Leech (2005),  p.33 - 34 
145 see Eldridge and Kealey (2005), p.15 
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147 see Holt (2007), p. 13 
148 see Bainbridge (2007), p.3 
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5.3 Costs vs. Benefits 
In contrast to costs, benefits are difficult to measure. The main benefits 
resulting from the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are the enhanced 
corporate disclosure, more trustworthy financial data due to the design of an 
effective internal control framework, improved investor confidence relating to 
financial reporting and the identification and prevention of financial fraud at an 
early stage.149 But since fraud occurs much less frequently, this benefit applies 
to a small amount of companies. The increased public trust caused by the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides benefit for companies as 
well.150 
Companies listing on the US stock market in order to bond to stricter regulations 
and better corporate governance systems can even benefit from a US listing 
after the enactment of SOX. Because of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the degree of 
listing requirements increases and therefore the benefits of a US listing rise as 
well since companies now have to meet the highest listing requirements. 
Hence, the bonding mechanism gets intensified and gains additional 
reliability.151 
Offering foreign stock on a US stock exchange always means for controlling 
shareholders of the said company dealing with more liabilities and constraints 
than on every other exchange. Therefore, the company can control its funds 
more easily since analysts and institutional stockholders observe controlling 
shareholders.152 Due to the tightened investigation and demanding 
transparency of SOX, benefits of controlling shareholders are diminished.153 
This enhanced monitoring and protection of minority shareholders definitely is a 
plus for the decision to cross-list in the US. 
 
Costs provided by Section 404 occur due to the preparation of the auditor’s 
affirmation report and the management’s establishment of the needed report on 
its internal controls. Before a company is qualified for the auditor’s attestation, it 
has to assess and keep records of its internal controls. Furthermore it has to 
                                                
149 see Eldridge and Kealey (2005), p.5 
150 see Ahmed et al. (2009), p. 3 
151 see Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008), p. 12 
152 see Doidge et al. (2007), p.9 
153 see Hostak, Lys, Yang and Karaglou (2011), p.7 
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decide what adjustments are required in order to enhance its internal control 
system, apply these adjustments and ultimately recheck the effectiveness of the 
updated and improved internal controls. This procedure causes costs due to the 
enlarged personnel expenditures, additional investment costs for new or 
improved technology and the increased external auditing fees.154 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act involves compliance costs being fixed in large part. 
Most likely economies of scales occur while implementing SOX making small 
companies being worse off than large companies.155 Companies with already 
good corporate governance tend to feature costs exceeding benefits after the 
implementation of SOX.156 While around 60% of European managers state that 
in case of cross-listing benefits exceed the costs, approximately 29% claim the 
opposite. Also Canadian managers constituting 61% are certain that the 
benefits of foreign-listing exceed costs.157 
 
5.4 Firm Value 
In literature opinions differ whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has influence on a 
company’s listing decision and whether this implemented Act has impact on a 
corporation’s firm value. 
 
Bianconi, Chen and Yoshino (2010) claim that the firm value has been impacted 
negatively by SOX. This Act induced a segmented market situation implying a 
smaller but more profitable amount of firms as members of the US market. But 
a larger amount of companies with low firm value decide to cross-list at stock 
exchanges in Hong Kong or Germany investigating benefits of cross-listing by 
signaling.158 
 
In contrast, Li, Pincus and Rego (2006) argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
a positive influence on the firm value of a company cross-listing in the US. Their 
univariate analysis shows positive abnormal returns in connection with events of 
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SOX like the publication of the House Senate Conference report and execution 
of the Act shown by various actions of SEC. These events coincide with the 
shareholders’ assumption that the Act as a net beneficial outcome. The event 
study shows the positive and significant relation between company’s income 
management and abnormal stock returns after the implementation of SOX. An 
increasing quality of annual report information leads to an improved ability of a 
firm to manage its income.159 
 
Jain and Rezaee (2004) suggest that the benefits of SOX definitely outweigh 
the costs resulting from this Act. They used a cross-sectional analysis to assign 
market reaction to costs and benefits of SOX. The finding shows positive 
abnormal returns during the events of the Act. Measured by factors like 
corporate governance, audit functions and financial reporting SOX shows an 
increasing firm value and furthermore points out that positive market reactions 
are more likely for companies already having an excellent compliance similar to 
the Act.160 
 
Zhang (2005) insists that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a negative effect on firm 
value since the abnormal returns during the events concerning this Act are 
negative. Findings show that companies with poor corporate governance tend 
to feature even lower abnormal returns and therefore they do not profit from 
improved governance rules at all.161 
 
5.5 Corporate Governance 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act implicates requirements having positive and negative 
influence on a firm’s governance.  
Companies already having good governance might react more negatively since 
they do not achieve the same amount of benefits. Having good corporate 
governance includes the competence to raise capital. High growth companies 
being in need for external capital and not being able to oblige themselves to 
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161 see Zhang (2005), p. 36 
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domestic corporate governance standards should profit by improved 
requirements caused by SOX. 162 
Additional, companies being located in countries with disclosure requirements 
of higher value have to bear larger costs caused by SOX than companies being 
located in countries with poor disclosure rules.163 
 
5.6 Event Study 
A study provided by Litvak (2007) analyzes share price reactions of cross-listed 
companies being subject to the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. After 
the announcement saying that SOX will apply to foreign-listed issuers, cross-
listed companies underlying SOX show declining stock prices in comparison to 
foreign-listed companies not being subject to SOX. Declines have been the 
strongest for high-disclosing companies while companies with faster growth 
bear weaker decreases. 164 
There have been different events in conjunction with the adoption and 
interpretation of SOX causing a whole event history, e.g. the clarification of the 
term “issuer” by Senator Sarbanes, the decision to not exclude foreign 
companies from assuring financial statements, the implementation of Section 
302 of SOX (“Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual 
Reports”), introducing the disclosure requirements described in Section 404 and 
many more. Every event relates to a negative stock price reaction except the 
announcement of a possible exemption for foreign companies being cross-listed 
in the US, which was related to a positive stock price reaction.165 
In a nutshell, firms either being subject to high-disclosure rules or featuring low 
growth have to face larger costs while firms with high growth being located in 
countries offering poor governance have to bear smaller costs after the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.166 
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5.7 The Delisting Decision 
SOX implicates additional costs of complying that are responsible for the 
increase of cross-listing expenses. Companies might decide to deregister their 
shares in order do avoid upcoming expenditures and additional corporate 
governance requirements.  
The deregistration decision has different effects on certain participants of a 
company: if a company decides to delist from a US stock exchange because of 
the enhanced costs of compliance, non-controlling and controlling shareholders 
benefit from this decision. But in contrast, if a company decides to delist due to 
enhanced governance mandates, controlling shareholders profit being stacked 
against non-controlling shareholders.167 Minority shareholders of companies 
deciding to delist would profit from SOX caused by the possible reduction of 
agency costs.168 
The controlling shareholder’s private benefit of control is known as agency 
costs. 
A company will always try to leave the US stock exchange if controlling 
shareholders happen to be placed in a worse position because of increased 
compliance costs and tightened governance requirements. In this case, 
controlling shareholders will not benefit from a cross-listing at the US stock 
market any longer.169 
Analyses demonstrate that the discussions about SOX did not have a negative 
impact on stock prices, but the announcement of a company to deregister from 
the US stock market definitely was associated with stock price decline. 
Additional, firms deciding to delist often feature weaker corporate governance 
performances. In a nutshell, the importance of controlling shareholder’s profits 
has been of major influence for the delisting determination and exit from the US 
stock market as well.170 Therefore, companies are likely to delist because 
controlling shareholders are afraid of being worse off.  
Observing the number of deregistered firms before and after the implementation 
of SOX one can see that this Act definitely has distinct influence on foreign 
companies: Only 22 foreign companies delisted in the timeframe covering 1990 
                                                
167 see Hostak et a. (2011), p.7 
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169 see Hostak et al. (2011), p.7 
170 see Hostak (2011), p.29 
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to 2001, while 96 companies deregistered between 2002 and 2005. 171 77% of 
companies deciding to delist from the US stock exchanges mentioned costs of 
compliance as a reason to deregister while more than 40% of them named the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a cause to delist. Companies referring directly to SOX 
had to face a significantly more negative market response than firms that 
referred to costs of compliance being the cause for their delisting decision. In 
contrast, only 21.6% of firms delisting from the LSE referred to “costs” as a 
reason for this decision while 9.8% cited “costs and other reasons” as an 
incitement.172 
Additional, research provided by Hostak, Karaglu, Lys and Yang (2011) shows 
that these deregistered companies feature corporate governance 
characteristics, like high range of separation of cash-flow rights and control and 
poor amount of independent directors, being weaker. Comparing these steps 
backwards from the US stock exchanges with delistings from the LSE Main 
Market, compliance costs and corporate governance representatives do not 
influence UK deregistrations.173 
Since the stricter requirements involved by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are likely to 
have severe effects on small companies, one can assume that these firms tend 
to deregister in order to avoid upcoming costs.  
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6 Comparison of Different Countries 
 
Literature shows different approaches identifying whether the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the involved stricter regulations have harmed the competitiveness of 
the US stock markets. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) claim that the 
implementation of SOX did not harm the attractiveness of the US stock 
exchanges. Since the US stock market is the only one generating a listing 
premium, which is extremely strong and did not decrease after 2001, firms still 
benefit from a US listing.174 In contrast, Engel, Hayes and Wang (2005) argue 
that SOX had a negative impact on the foreign listing behavior leading to fewer 
listings on US stock exchanges. After the enactment of SOX especially small 
firms decided to go private as a consequence of the increasing costs caused by 
the Act. Costs of compliance with SOX account for almost $ 5 million without 
taking account for opportunity costs like attention and time of management and 
board members. Thus, post-SOX going-private might be more economically 
advantageous since the net benefits of SOX do not outweigh the compliance 
costs.175  
Authors indicate the UK stock exchanges for being the biggest competitors for 
the US after the implementation of SOX. That represents an issue being 
addressed in this chapter.  
 
6.1 The Listing Decision 
Companies willing to list first need to analyze benefits and costs of listing 
exchanges in order to choose a host market. Benefits vary depending on what a 
company’s manager is looking for: liquid capital market, briefed shareholder 
base or positive effects through bonding. These factors influence a company’s 
decision to either list on a US or UK stock exchange.176 
                                                
174 see Doidge et a. (2007), p. 42 
175 see Engel, Hayes and Wang (2005), p. 8-9, 24 
176 see Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008), p. 14 
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Events like the establishment of the NYSE Euronext caused by the merger of 
already existent stock exchanges and the globalization originated by trading 
electronically have changed the possibilities of cross-listing. It is difficult to 
distinguish these factors and the foundation of the highly successful AIM from 
SOX and its effect on a company’s listing decision.177 
 
6.1.1 Industrial Specialization 
Costs and disclosure requirements are not the only factors, which affect the 
listing decision. Companies often examine the industrial specialization of the 
foreign market before trading their shares abroad. They are drawn to stock 
markets that host prestigious firms coming from the same sector since those 
markets feature analysts specializing in this area and shareholders scan the 
market for companies from the sector to invest in. NASDAQ is known for being 
the host market for firms of the technology sector. In contrast, the NYSE hosts 
telecommunication and health care specialized firms. The LSE Main Market 
presents companies from oil & gas, basic materials and utilities divisions.178 
According to an analysis provided by Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) the NYSE 
and the LSE Main Market are the preferred stock exchange for financial service 
companies like insurance firms or banks. 40% of all AIM listings represent 
companies from the Chemicals/Oil & Gas/Metals/Mining/Forestry sector while 
only 10% of all companies listed on NASDAQ are businesses operating in this 
sector. The NASDAQ hosts companies from the Software/Technology and 
Pharmaceutical/Biotechnology sector that account for 40% of all its listings. 
Only 15% of the AIM holds listings appearing in this sector.179 
But even time influences a company’s decision where to list its shares. For 
example, in the 1990s the Internet boom disposed a massive amount of foreign 
firms (especially technology firms) to trade their stock at the American 
NASDAQ.180 
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6.1.2 Signaling 
According to a model generated by Bianconi et al. (2010) cross-listed firms 
have a lower Tobin’s Q181 after the implementation of SOX in 2002. Additionally, 
companies having a low Tobin’s Q before 2002 rather started to cross-list their 
shares on a foreign stock exchange after the beginning of the liability of SOX 
than they did before. This movement can be caused by the company’s attempt 
trying to signal a well financial condition to the market and therefore persuading 
potential investors of their simulated financial power. Therefore, these 
companies utilize the raised rules of SOX and the signaling hypothesis. Usually, 
the latter is used by a company to show its ability to deal with the more stringent 
liabilities of foreign listing requirements due to its financial capacities.182 
 
6.2 UK vs. US Stock Exchanges 
Due to its investor protection and liquidity, the UK stock exchange is the most 
comparable one to the US stock market.  
 
In the last years, the UK stock exchanges became more and more popular. But 
London’s fascination does not necessarily find its cause in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The foundation of the AIM (Alternative Investment Market) successfully 
attracts a large amount of companies making the UK stock market to a popular 
and appealing alternative to the US stock exchanges. 
 
Larger and more lucrative companies tend to cross-list on the bigger exchanges 
like the NYSE and the LSE. In return, smaller firms with chances of anticipated 
growth feel attracted to the NASDAQ or AIM. Although AIM and NASDAQ are 
pretty similar, slightly larger and more lucrative companies tend to choose the 
NASDAQ to cross-list while the AIM attracts companies from arising markets.183 
Companies with poor corporate governance tend to avoid listing on a US stock 
exchange, while large companies with the intention to raise equity in the foreign 
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market feel attracted to the US stock exchange.184 These factors influence a 
company’s listing decision absent the existence of SOX. 
 
6.2.1 The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market 
In 1995 the AIM has been founded with its focus on small local companies. 
Corporations decided to list their shares on this less regulated and more 
inexpensive market, which is known for companies exceeding venture capital 
markets but not being ready to offer their stock on a usual exchange. In 2002 
the AIM experienced a tremendous increase since foreign companies opened 
up to this market. 31 international listings in 2001 went up to 310 global listings 
in 2007. But this gain in UK listings does not mean losses in the US listings 
since the AIM often appeals to firms that typically do not list. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to examine whether companies now listing on the AIM would have 
decided to offer their shares on a US stock exchange in absence of SOX.185  
 
Since the AIM mostly attracts small companies one can assume that these 
corporations would not have listed in the US and therefore the US stock 
exchange did non lose any members to the AIM.186 
Listing companies still have the same criteria they used to have before the 
implementation of SOX. Just little proof exists demonstrating that corporations 
make their listing decisions in a different manner compared to the years before 
SOX.187 
The LSE is offering companies strong investor protection and liquidity like the 
US does, but this UK stock exchange is advertising their lack of regulatory 
hurdles caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.188 
 
6.2.2 The Effect of SOX on the Attractiveness of US Stock Exchanges 
Research covering the time period from June 1995 to June 2009 and provided 
by Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) shows that common listing behavior 
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changed after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: in comparison to the 
period before SOX, listing activity on the NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE decreased 
while listing activity on a monthly basis on the AIM increased by approximately 
775%.189 After the implementation of SOX a company’s likelihood choosing the 
US stock market as a host market decreased by 16%. Some corporations might 
choose the UK stock exchange instead of the US stock exchange.190  
 
The US listing activity declined after the implementation of the Act. 82% of 
companies avoiding US stock exchanges in favor of listing on UK stock 
exchanges tend to list on AIM. Unsurprisingly, these corporations are less 
lucrative, smaller and do not use high quality auditors like the typical firm listing 
on American stock exchanges. These companies find costs provided by SOX 
harder to bear with than large companies do.191 
But one has to differentiate between attributes of companies bypassing a US 
listing and choosing one of the UK exchanges:  
• larger and more profit-making companies from countries with poor 
shareholder protection and little economic growth being attracted to LSE 
Main Market and  
• even smaller and less profitable companies from common law or 
developed countries engaging less prestigious auditors being attracted to 
AIM.  
There exists a small amount of firms listing in the US but being supposed to list 
in UK according to their industry-specific, home country and firm characteristics. 
These companies are most certainly from emerging economic systems 
assembling bonding benefits and increased reputation of a US listing following 
the Act. Additional these firms show approximately 24.6 Billion Dollar market 
capitalization and are more beneficial and larger than the common UK listing.192 
 
Another research developed by Piotrsoki and Srinivasan (2008) shows that 
companies from Code Law countries and companies from countries with poor 
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shareholder protection both tend to list in the US after the enactment of SOX in 
order to profit from the benefits provided by the Act.193 
 
Having a look at smaller companies and their decision between listing on either 
NASDAQ or AIM (in case of being eligible for both exchanges), the listing 
activity on the American NASDAQ decreased by 28% after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The additional costs provided by the Act and AIM being a 
home for companies with growth probabilities prevents small companies from 
listing on the NASDAQ.194 Then again the probability of a listing on the US stock 
exchange increased by 1% in case of comparing NASDAQ and LSE Main 
Market listings. Since larger firms tend to list on the LSE it seems like benefits 
caused by SOX might exceed the costs involved by the Act.195 
 
In a nutshell, large companies did not change their likelihood to list at US stock 
exchanges. The American exchanges might have gotten more popular due to 
the stricter regulations and involved shareholder protection. Additional, large 
companies have less issues dealing with the extra costs the implementation of 
SOX implicates. 
Small companies did change their listing choices after the implementation of 
SOX, which causes a decline in US listings.196 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not have an impact on large companies deciding 
between US and UK stock exchanges, but small firms definitely got influenced 
by SOX concerning their choice of listing exchanges. The attractiveness of 
listing on NASDAQ definitely declined after the implementation of SOX making 
AIM to an appealing stock market. The AIM attracts foreign listings because of 
its strong expansion in local listings.197  
 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) come to the conclusion that small companies 
did experience effects caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act while large firm did 
not get affected. The market capitalization of companies being affected is 
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smaller in a significant way than the one of firms not being affected by the 
stricter requirements of the Act resulting in a changed listing decision.198 
 
6.3 The Listing Premium 
Another way to analyze the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on foreign listings 
is having a closer look at the valuation premium for cross-listings in the US. Did 
the listing premium declined as a consequence of SOX? Does the UK offer a 
superior listing premium? 
 
Cross-listing entails large costs (e.g. more stringent accounting and corporate 
governance rules) that might be compensated by a premium. In case this 
premium decreases, the attractiveness of US stock markets decreases 
simultaneously.199 
Premium of cross-listings are kind of linked to regulatory modifications giving 
the chance to evaluate regulatory modifications observed by shareholders. If 
SOX involves more costs than benefits, premia for companies listed with Level 
II or III should fall. In case of improving investors’ belief, SOX generates an 
increase of premia for Level II or III companies in contrast to a decreasing 
premium for Level I or IV companies.200 
 
Although the premium for listings in the US has been reported to be constant 
and significant in data of all reviewed years, there occurs a slight change:  the 
valuation premium of 17.5% over the period from 1990 to 2001 declined to a 
valuation premium of 14.3% from 2002 to 2005.201 
According to the analysis of Doidge et al. (2007) SOX did not have an impact on 
the valuation premium of foreign companies offering their stock on US markets. 
But since this panel regression includes companies with good and weak 
remedy, the outcome might be falsified due to an “averaging effect”.202 
 
                                                
198 see Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008), p. 38 
199 see Litvak (2007a), p.1862 
200 see Litvak (2007a), p. 1862 
201 see Doidge et al. (2007), p.36 
202 see Doidge et al. (2007), p.37 
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Additionally, SOX does not necessarily have to be the reason for a decline of 
listing premium. The scandals leading to SOX might be the cause for a weaker 
premium since US governance might has lost confidence. But since there was 
no significant price reaction after the publication of the WorldCom incident back 
in the middle of 2002, this theory can be ruled out.203 
 
Unlike the permanent listing premium provided by US stock exchanges, the UK 
stock market does not even feature a cross-listing premium.204 Therefore cross-
listing in the US definitely is a plus for companies attaching importance to 
receive a premium.  
 
An analysis provided by Litvak (2007a) also investigates the influence of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on a company’s cross-listing premium. Firms from 
countries with low corporate governance communicate its capabilities by 
complying themselves to stricter rules and requirements. This move reflected in 
the bonding theory minimizes a company’s cost of capital due to abandoning 
concealment and chances for self-dealing by controlling shareholders. In 
addition, in comparison to firms with Level I or IV listings, companies with Level 
II or III listings feature higher premium by the use of cross-listing.205 
 
Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio of companies with Level II or III ADRs 
declined significantly in comparison to Level I or IV companies and companies 
not being cross-listed at all. More beneficial firms, companies found in high 
disclosure countries, firms offering a high disclosure (before SOX) and firms 
with larger GDP per capita have to bear larger descents. 206 Tobin’s Q declined 
by 17.5% for Level II or III listed companies in comparison to a decline of 6.7% 
of Level I or IV listed companies. This difference is significant as well as the 
difference between Level II or III listed firms and companies not being cross-
listed at all (7.2% loss). Level I or IV listed firms and firms not being cross-listed 
on foreign exchanges at all show similar shifts of market-to-book-ratios. Cross-
listed companies not applying to SOX show an increase of listing premium while 
                                                
203 see Litvak (2007a), p.1863 
204 see Doidge et al. (2007), p.29 
205 see Litvak (2007a), p.1860 
206 see Litvak (2007a), p.1861 
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cross-listed companies being subject to SOX feature a decrease of listing 
premia. This decline can be explained by investors’ negative reaction to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.207 
 
                                                
207 see Litvak (2007a), p.1878 
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
In the last decades the importance of corporate governance increased 
tremendously. Incidents like the Financial Crisis back in 2008 and ongoing 
accounting scandals of companies (WorldCom, Enron, Arthur Anderson etc.) 
led to a decreasing investor confidence. There are numerous negative 
influences a company has to deal with in case of having a weak corporate 
governance system. The incidents of WorldCom and Enron illustrate exemplary 
what consequences occur in case of failure to comply with corporate 
governance rules and insufficient self-regulation of auditors. Having a good 
corporate governance system reduces a firm’s risk of ending up in a financial 
crisis. Therefore establishing a corporate governance system including the 
protection of minority as well as majority shareholders is fundamental.  
 
Since the 1900s companies raised their incentive to offer stock on foreign 
exchanges. The option to bond themselves to a better corporate governance 
system and to diversify the risk of their portfolios internationally are just two of 
the many reasons why foreign listing enhances a company’s quality.  
 
Due to the emerging doubts of investors the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been 
enacted on 30 July 2002. This Act is a corporate governance rule with the 
intention to avoid additional cases of financial damage and demonstrates a 
global development in order to restore shareholder confidence. Consisting of 11 
titles with 65 subtitles altogether SOX describes actions and consequences to 
different audiences to ensure the reliability of financial information reported to 
the public. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act holds for every public company being 
subject to the Securities Exchange Commission, even foreign companies have 
to deal with this enhances requirements in case of listing on a US stock 
exchange. 
 
In this paper I compare US and UK stock exchanges to analyze whether the 
stricter rules of SOX had a negative impact on the cross-listing behavior of 
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foreign companies. Due to its improved shareholder rights and investor 
protection the UK stock exchanges display a serious competitor for US stock 
exchanges. After opposing costs (direct and indirect), audit costs, benefits, firm 
value and influence on corporate governance of companies listing on the US 
stock market after the implementation of SOX it is pretty obvious that the Act 
changes US listing conditions enormously.  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act involves additional costs a company has to bear in 
case of offering its stock on foreign exchanges via Level II or Level III ADRs. 
Companies trading with Level I and IV ADRs are able to avoid stricter rules 
since there are not subject to SOX. These costs might not be significant for 
large firms, but they incriminate small companies. While the Act does not seem 
to affect large companies, the costs put a much bigger strain on small 
companies with weak corporate governance. But besides costs SOX even 
entails additional work for a company since an internal control system has to be 
implemented and tested by the auditor (Section 404). 
 
After the implementation of SOX in 2002 the amount of foreign listings on US 
stock exchanges has declined. There exist several reasons for this decrease 
showing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might not be the only cause for the 
diminishing attractiveness of the US stock market: 
• The increasing attractiveness of regional exchanges may have outshined 
the preferences of US stock exchanges. 
• The nature of foreign companies looking for stock exchanges from 
abroad might became different. 
• The rising popularity of a listing on UK stock exchanges might have 
increased due to the positive development of the Alternative Investment 
Market.208 With the increase from 31 international listings in 2001 to 310 
global listings in 2007 the AIM definitely shows its competiveness. While 
NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE showed a decreasing listing activity during the 
time period from June 1995 to June 2009, listing activity on AIM showed 
an increase of approximately 775%. After the implementation of SOX a 
company’s likelihood to list on a US stock exchange decreased. 82% of 
                                                
208 see Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008), p. 3 
 60 
the firms bypassing a US listing in favor of listing at the UK stock market 
tend to choose AIM.  
 
Listing on a US stock exchange still has its advantages and shows the world a 
company’s capacity to comply with stricter requirements and being a global 
player. But the additional costs and disclosure requirements involved by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act might not be factors every company is able to deal with. A 
company has to decide for itself whether SOX has a positive or negative 
influence on its listing behavior. Firms have to analyze whether they face the 
stricter requirements caused by SOX or are better off listing on an UK stock 
exchange to avoid the Act.  
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V Appendix 
 
1 Abstract 
Having a look to the last decades, the importance of having a good corporate 
governance system increased tremendously. Incidents like the Financial Crisis 
back in 2008 and ongoing accounting scandals of companies like WorldCom 
and Enron leading to a decrease in shareholder confidence confirm the 
relevance of corporate governance.  
On July 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been enacted with the intention to 
restore investor confidence and ensure the reliability of financial information. 
The Act involves stricter legal requirements and obligates the management to 
establish an internal control framework. Since SOX exclusively applies to all 
public companies listing on US stock exchanges and being subject to the 
registration of SEC, even foreign firms have to underlie these stricter rules. 
As a consequence of globalization, companies raised their intention to list 
abroad in order to enter international markets and diversify the risk of their 
portfolios. Therefore many companies became subject to SOX. 
This work examines the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the foreign 
listing behavior of non-US companies. The amount of foreign listings on the US 
stock exchanges declined after 2002, which does not have to be caused by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Due to its enhanced shareholder rights and excellent 
investor protection the UK stock exchange features a serious competitor for US 
stock markets. Therefore I compared listing requirements, costs and benefits of 
these two stock exchange to examine whether companies feel deterred from 
SOX and rather list on the UK stock market or decide to be subject to SOX in 
order to profit from a US listing and its positive signal to the financial market. 
Literature shows that mostly small companies are worse off listing on the US 
stock exchanges after the implementation of the Act while large companies do 
not necessarily get affected. In the end every company has to decide for itself 
whether a US listing makes benefits exceeding costs even after the 
establishment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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2 Abriss 
In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist die Relevanz von Corporate Governance 
beträchtlich gestiegen. Vorfälle wie die Finanzkrise im Jahr 2008 und das 
Aufdecken von zahlreichen Bilanzfälschungsskandalen von Unternehmen wie 
WorldCom und Enron haben das Vertrauen von Aktionären negativ 
beeinträchtigt. Diese Vorfälle zeigen allerdings wie wichtig ein gutes Corporate 
Governance System für die Wirtschaftlichkeit eines Unternehmens ist. 
Am 30.Juli 2002 wurde der Sarbanes-Oxley Act mit dem Ziel erlassen das 
Vertrauen von Aktionären zurück zu gewinnen und die Verlässlichkeit von 
Finanzinformationen, die in die Öffentlichkeit kommuniziert werden, zu 
gewährleisten. Dieses Gesetz beinhaltet strengere rechtliche Anforderungen 
und verpflichtet das Management ein Internes Kontrollsystem einzurichten. Da 
SOX auf alle Unternehmen, die auf amerikanischen Börsen notieren und der 
Securities Exchange Commission unterworfen sind, angewendet wird, sind 
auch nicht-amerikanische Firmen von diesem Gesetz betroffen.  
Diese Arbeit betrachtet den Einfluss des Sarbanes-Oxley Acts auf das 
Fremdnotierungsverhalten von nicht-amerikanischen Unternehmen. Seit 2002 
ist die Anzahl der Notierungen auf amerikanischen Börsen zurück gegangen 
was aber nicht zwangsläufig alleinig auf die Implementierung von SOX zurück 
geführt werden muss. Auf Grund ausgezeichneter Aktionärrechte und 
Anlegerschutz stellt der britische Börsenmarkt eine ernsthafte Konkurrenz für 
amerikanische Börsenmarkte dar. Darum habe ich 
Börsennotierungsanforderungen, Kosten und Nutzen von US und UK Märkten 
gegenübergestellt um zu vergleichen ob sich Unternehmen von den Regeln des 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act abschrecken lassen und somit auf einer britischen Börse 
notieren, oder ob sie ihre Aktien auf Grund der ausgezeichneten Reputation 
weiterhin an der amerikanischen Börse anbieten.  
Die Literatur zeigt dass hauptsächlich kleinere Unternehmen unter der 
Implementierung von SOX leiden, während größere Unternehmen nicht 
signifikant beeinflusst werden.  
Schlussendlich muss jedes Unternehmen für sich selbst entscheiden ob der 
Nutzen einer amerikanischen Börsennotierung die Kosten selbst nach des 
Inkrafttretens  des Sarbanes-Oxley Acts noch übersteigt.  
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